From Nuisance to Environmental Protection in Continental Europe by Casado-Pérez, Vanessa & Gomez Liguerre, Carlos
Texas A&M University School of Law 
Texas A&M Law Scholarship 
Faculty Scholarship 
5-2019 
From Nuisance to Environmental Protection in Continental Europe 
Vanessa Casado-Pérez 
Texas A&M University School of Law, vcasado@law.tamu.edu 
Carlos Gomez Liguerre 
carlos.gomez@upf.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, and the Property 
Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Vanessa Casado-Pérez & Carlos Gomez Liguerre, From Nuisance to Environmental Protection in 
Continental Europe, 92 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1003 (2019). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/1387 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more 




VANESSA CASADO PEREZ* & CARLOS GOMEZ LIGUERREt
INTRODUCTION
Neighboring relationships are prone to conflict. The use of an estate has
effects on the one next to it. A doctor may be bothered by the noise coming
from a confectioner's business.1 The more heterogeneous the uses of the
pieces of property are, the more likely conflicts are to arise. While
individuals have always had the capacity to affect the enjoyment of their
neighbors, the situations became more complex with the advent of
industrialization, which put residential and industrial users in close
proximity.
Historically, the law of nuisance has been used to solve these conflicts.
Nuisance law combines property and liability rules leading to injunction and
damage remedies.2 Today, regulation has been added to the mix of solutions
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West, Stanford University. E-mail: vcasado@law.tamu.edu.
t. Profesor Titular, Universitat Pompeu Fabra Barcelona. Humboldt Research Scholarship for
Experienced Researchers - Alexander von Humboldt Stiffung. E-mail: carlos.gomez@upf.edu. The
authors want to thank the organizers of and participants in the Convergence and Divergence in Private
Law conference held at the New York University School of Law on November 1-3, 2018. The authors
thank Joseph Rebagliati and Steffani Fausone for their excellent research assistance.
1. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960).
2. This mix of remedies makes the analysis of this legal institution complex. "There is perhaps
no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance."' PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 86, at 616 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984). Professor
Henry Smith states that "[i]n light of these conflicting strains of thought about nuisance, the law of
nuisance is widely regarded as a 'mess,' a 'wilderness of law,' a 'legal garbage can,' and a 'mystery."'
Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 970 (2004)
(citations omitted). However, Professor Smith believes that there it is not so such a mess but a
combination of property rights delineating strategies. Id.
1003
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
to neighbors' disputes. In environmental matters-the litmus test for
nuisance-the choices are even more varied. As pollution got more
egregious, regulation took the center stage. The increase in the number of
parties tested the limits of the institution of nuisance. Regulation initially
took the form of permits and licenses for the most egregiously polluting
industries, often requiring those industries to adopt some precautions and,
thus, reducing the potential nuisances. Second, land use planning mitigated
the conflict between uses by regulating whether they were allowed to be in
close proximity. Third, countries enacted environmental laws because
industrialization brought the potential for smoke and particles to travel
beyond the land of the immediate neighbor. Furthermore, even ex post
liability has taken a regulatory turn with publicly enforced environmental
liability schemes.
Nuisance was the first line of defense against pollution, but today it has
been mostly superseded by regulatory schemes.3 This shift left nuisance with
a limited role-solving issues between a small number of close by
neighbors-in almost every jurisdiction that lacks figures like public
nuisance.4 While it is foreseeable that two parties will negotiate ex ante to
achieve a socially desirable outcome-for example, two parties may
establish an easement or servitude between neighboring plots of land
precluding potential nuisance'-the situation in which large amounts of
people or their lands are affected requires a different type of response.
Even though its role has been reduced, private law nuisance regulation
has not been static. Not only has the regulatory landscape become more
complex, but also, as law and economics literature has analyzed, nuisance
3. The literature is rich on the choice between ex ante regulation or ex post liability as substitutes.
For an account on this topic, see STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 277 84
(1st ed. 1987).
4. For a definition of public nuisance, see Nuisance, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https:I/www.
britannica.com/topic/nuisance#ref59803 (last visited May 17, 2019). For an analysis of public nuisance,
see generally John E. Bryson & Angus Macbeth, Public Nuisance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
and Environmental Law, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 241 (1972).
5. Richard A. Epstein, The Economic Structure of Roman Property Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW AND SOCIETY 513,521 (Paul J. du Plessis et al. eds., 2016).
To prevent undue complication of the title, the general law restricts the scope of servitudes. It
is not possible to place a servitude on a servitude, or subject them to time limitations or specific
conditions. Similarly, servitudes can only bind adjacent properties, thus reducing the difficulty
of detecting who is in breach, and facilitating (by reducing the number of parties) the
renegotiation or termination of the servitude. These restrictions on freedom of contract give
greater clarity to third persons without imposing serious economic disadvantages on the initial
parties or their successors in title. The practices that are barred are ones that generally do not
make economic sense. The added clarity to the relationship allows servitudes to hold their value
over time.
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provisions have gone beyond the building blocks of property and liability
rules, demonstrating the complexity of current regulation in scenarios of
conflicting uses of property6 and acknowledging the interplay with public
regulatory standards.
The codification and evolution of nuisance in civil law jurisdictions
illustrates perfectly the evolution just described. This Article analyzes the
evolution and complexity of the legal responses to neighboring conflicts in
European civil law countries. All of the civil codes analyzed (France,
Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, and Catalonia) are based on Roman law
rules that are not always clear. The fuzziness of those Roman law rules
explains, in part, why the civil codes did not respond homogenously to
nuisances, despite this common origin. The first Subsection briefly describes
the institution of nuisance in Roman law. Then, this Article describes the
original codification of nuisance and the changes in the treatment of this
institution. After assessing the initial divergence and the trends towards
similar rules across jurisdictions, this Article explains the potential forces of
convergence at the European level: the Draft Common Frame of Reference,
the E.U. Environmental Liability Directive, and the decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights.
7
I. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NUISANCE PROVISIONS
A. NUISANCE AND ROMAN LAW: A COMMON ORIGIN
Continental civil law jurisdictions' nuisance regulation has a common
origin: Roman law. There are few Roman texts dealing with nuisance. It is
clear from the Digest of Justinian ("Digest") that there was an action against
someone who interferes with another's property with intention to injure
(innuria).8 The response to the most common nuisance situation, in which a
landowner injures another's piece of land by using his own land in a
purportedly legal way without aiming at affecting the enjoyment of his
neighbors, did not have a clear footing in Roman law.
9
6. Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Startling Rules, 106
YALE L.J. 2149, 2160-66 (1997).
7. It is important to note that this Article focuses only on regulations and remedies related to
nontrespassory invasions on real property, not on noninvasive, aesthetic nuisances.
8. DIG. 47.10.44 (Javolenus, From the Posthumous Works of Labeo 9).
9. See JAMES GORDLEY & ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRIVATE LAW 167-71 (2006); see also THOMAS GLYN WATKN, AN
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO MODERN CIVIL LAW 255-56 (1999); David B. Schorr, Historical
Analysis in Environmental Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL HISTORY 1001, 1008 (Markus D.
Dubber & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2018); Peter G. Stein, 'Equitable' Remedies for the Protection of
2019] 1005
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There was a sense that although private property was absolute, there
were some inacceptable interferences. Among interferences, smoke was the
one that troubled medieval jurists the most when interpreting the Digest. The
Digest explained that an owner of a cheese shop emitting smoke cannot
interfere with his neighbor's property, but the owner who emits smoke from
a hearth can.10 Bartolus of Saxoferrato, one of the greatest medieval jurists,
suggested that what matters is the amount of smoke and the normal or
abnormal character of the activity.1 The lack of consensus among medieval
jurists translated into different provisions in different jurisdictions at the time
of codification.
B. EVOLUTION: FROM PROPERTY TO TORTS
While there was discussion about the limits of property in Roman law,
the civil codes adopted a very broad vision of property as stated in article
544 of the French Civil Code of 1804: "[p]roperty is the right of enjoying
and disposing of things in the most absolute manner, provided they are not
used in a way prohibited by the laws or statutes."12 The same trend can be
observed in article 348 of the Spanish Civil Code13 and in section 903 of the
German one. 14 But this trend continues even today; the Catalan Civil Code,
the most recent of continental Europe, still captures the same idea. 
15
Even though property was deemed absolute, European civil codes did
not absolutely ignore negative externalities caused by a use of a piece of real
estate property to neighboring ones. European civil codes regulate the
equivalent of the tort of nuisance in two ways: as an action protecting
property by injunction and as a tort action for damages. 16
Property, in NEW PERSPECTIVES IN THE ROMAN LAW OF PROPERTY 185, 194 (Peter Birks ed., 1989).
10. DIG. 8.5.8 (Ulpian, Edict 17).
11. See GORDLEY & TAYLOR VON MEITREN, supra note 9, at 169-70.
12. THE CODE NAPOLEON; OR, THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 544, at 150 (A Barrister of the Inner
Temple trans., 1827) [hereinafter THE NAPOLEONIC CODE OF 1804], http://files.libertyfund.org/
files/2353/CivilCode_1566_Bk.pdf (providing a translation of the French Civil Code of 1804).
13. CODIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 348 (Spain), translated in MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA,
SPANISH CIVIL CODE 70 (Da Sofia de Ram6n-Laca Clausen trans., 2013).
14. "The owner of a thing may, to the extent that a statute or third-party rights do not conflict with
this, deal with the thing at his discretion and exclude others from every influence." BGRGERLICHES
GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CRvL CODE], § 903, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-intemet.de/
englisch bgb/englisch bgb.html#p3704 (Ger.).
15. "Property acquired legally grants to the owners the right to the full use of the properties that
constitute its object and to possess and dispose thereof." CODI CIVIL DE CATALUNYA art. 541-1, translated
in Law 5/2006, of 10 May, on the Fifth Book of the Civil Code of Catalonia, Relating to Real Rights,
PARLAMENT DE CATALUNYA 23, https://www.parlament.cat/web/documentacio/altres-versions/lleis-
versions/index.html (last visited May 17, 2019).
16. The structure of these legal claims resembles the order suggested by Smith, supra note 2, at
1006 [Vol. 92:1003
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The regulation against nontrespassory invasions is understood primarily
as a regulation between eighboring owners, and solutions are sought first in
the realm of property. As a result of their common Roman law origins,
European civil codes approach property holistically. 17 In this first building
block-the property one-nuisance is configured as a sub-type of trespass,
with the difference being that intrusion, instead of being physical, is
produced by intangible substances.18 The European civil codes incorporate
rules that seek to solve the problem of immissions (nontrespassory invasions)
ex ante through the constitution of easements, which allow the owner of an
estate to carry out annoying activities and force the owner of another estate
to put up with them. The easement can be constituted by agreement between
the affected parties or by law. The basic ex post remedy against a nuisance
is the action of cessation (from the Roman law actio negatoria), 19 with which
the affected owner can paralyze the activities that are not covered by a
servitude, similar to the remedy of injunction. This action is both an action
and remedy. The right of damages has, in this first building block, a residual
position.
Property rules, however, do not work that well when the owners are no
longer contiguous and when the victims of the immission are many and
cannot be identified ex ante.2 0 As a result of the industrialization and the
978-81, according to which the availability of different remedies depends on the level of information
shared by the affected parties. The choice between property or liability rules, as the choice between
exclusion and governance as strategies to delineate property rights, depends on the cost of information.
Accordingly, nuisance has components of both liability and property rules.
17. This holistic approach differs from the more fragmented common law one. Yun-chien Chang
& Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common Law Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1, 7 (2012). According to these authors, the differences are not relevant. The divergence is just
explained by a different system of property delineation. Id. at 5-6; see also Henry E. Smith, Exclusion
Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S457
(2002) [hereinafter Smith, Exclusions Versus Governance].
18. The difference between trespass and nuisance is far from clear, as it happens in the common
law. "The distinction between liability in trespass to land, nuisance, and Rylands v. Fletcher is extremely
fine and varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction within the Common Law." KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN
KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 606 (Tony Weir trans., 3d rev. ed. 1998).
19. HERBERT HAUSMANINGER & RICHARD GAMAUF, AM. PHILOLOGICAL ASS'N, A CASEBOOK
ON ROMAN PROPERTY LAW 232 n.34 (George A. Sheets trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2012) (2003); see
also REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN
TRADITION 910 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996).
20. The growth in the number of victims increases transaction costs to the potential tortfeasor
because it would need to reach an agreement with each of the victims as to the best way to compensate
them. In such a scenario, liability rules are better. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1108-09
(1972); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 62-66 (9th ed. 2014). But see
Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls,
40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 690, 729-30 (1973). For Professors Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, the choice
2019] 1007
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proliferation of highly polluting industrial activities, the scenario just
described with multiple parties affected became commonplace. At that time,
in the late nineteenth to early twentieth century, a second phase started where
tort law and its ex post remedies supplemented the property protection in
continental European legal traditions. Liability rules were applied to
nuisance cases by either extending the rules of the law of torts or by
jurisprudential doctrines, such as abuse of rights, which require reparation of
the damage caused even though it is caused in the exercise of a pre-existing
right. Some jurisdictions extended the general fault-based torts and, in other
jurisdictions, strict liability provisions were enacted."' As we shall see, the
idea of strict liability was difficult for European civil codes to embrace,22 but
the problems that nuisance tackles fit better in a strict liability framework. In
fact, strict liability is preferable to forms of negligence because it affects the
incentives of the polluter in relation to both precautions and the level of
activity.
23
In a third phase, even tort law proves to be insufficient. Administrative
regulations start by regulating dangerous activities to health and the
environment, becoming the benchmark for the standard of care. In most
cases, those activities that have been authorized according to administrative
regulations cannot be enjoined.4 The estate owner affected by another's
activity can only request compensation for the damages he suffered. The role
of liability rules has, thus, been reinforced in this phase dominated by
between a property or a liability rule lies not only on the existence of transaction costs but also on the
existence of imperfect information in relation to the potential damages (of the tortfeasor, the victim, and
the judge deciding the case). See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules:
An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 719 (1996). For a general explanation, see Keith N.
Hylton, The Economics of Nuisance Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY
LAW 326, 323-43 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011). Professor Smith defines two strategies
to delineate property rights: exclusion and governance. The cessation action belongs to the former, with
the rest of nuisance to the latter. Nuisance is thus a hybrid. See Smith, supra note 2, at 991. For a general
account of exclusion versus governance as methods of delineating property rights, see Smith, Exclusions
Versus Governance, supra note 17, at S457-67.
21. For a comparative survey, see Jean Limpens et al., Liability for One's Own Act, in 11
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: TORTS pt. 1, 119-25 (Andr6 Tunc ed., 1983).
22. See Gerhard Wagner, Comparative Tort Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE
LAW 1003, 1029-34 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2008).
23. Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 7 (1980).
24. Administrative agencies displace owners as first-order decisionmakers who can choose any
use they want for their properties. This governance rule comes accompanied by a displacement of
injunction as an available remedy. The right of the neighbor not to be interfered with by the use of
someone else's plot of land is now protected only by a liability rule. This does not mean though that
property rules protecting entitlements via injunction do no longer exist. They still apply to all situations
in which uses do not require an administrative authorization. For an analysis of the trade-offs between
property and liability rules, see Smith, supra note 2, at 1047-48.
[Vol. 92:10031008
NUISANCE TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
administrative rules.
Remedies offer the most succinct way to summarize the evolution of
nuisance. Initially, injunction (cessation action) was the main remedy. Then,
jointly with injunction, damage compensation entered the picture. Finally,
damage compensation became the main private law remedy because the
tortfeasor may have had to pay compensation but the tortfeasor did not need
to stop the action if it was protected by an administrative license.
25
C. COUNTRY PROVISIONS
This Section describes the different provisions. As noted, the original
codification of nuisances in the different civil codes was not homogenous
even though all traditions stem from Roman law. The lack of homogeneity
across jurisdictions could also be explained by the date of approval and the
stage of industrialization of different countries at the initial point of
codification. The civil codes, which codify all of private law, of different
countries were approved at different points in their history, from the 1800s
to the early 2000s. Some codes were approved during the first industrial
revolution, which ended in the early 1800s; others in the midst of the second
industrial revolution in the late 1800s and early 1900s; and others around the
mid-1900s when zoning was introduced. The differences, as shall be seen,
do not exactly track the different levels of industrialization. It would be
expected that a higher level of industrialization at the time of codification
translated into a more fine-grained nuisance provision. In a more refined
version of such a hypothesis, those countries where industrialization is
mature may give a clearer response to nuisance. Before, while on their way
to industrialization, the marginal value of the immission is high enough that
the willingness to stop it may be lower.26 But as industrialization advances,
the marginal benefit of more industrial activities declines, and thus, conflicts
may be solved favoring the nonindustrial actor.27 This is reflected in the
jurisprudence of the German courts, which updated its interpretation of the
nuisance provisions.28 The latter illustrates that the legislator was not the
25. Professor Saul Levmore has described an evolution of remedies from a property rule to a
liability rule. The continental European process does not fit into any of the typologies proposed by
Professor Levmore. In the case of nuisance, European regulation has changed from a property rule (A
stops B) to another damage compensation rule without the need to stop the activity (B pays A, but B can
continue his activity provided that B complies with the administrative authorization of the activity).
Levmore, supra note 6, at 2156; see also Smith, supra note 2, at 970.
26. Kenneth S. Abraham, The Relation Between Civil Liability and Environmental Regulation:
An Analytical Overview, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 379, 384 (2002).
27. Id.
28. See infra Section I.C.2.
2019] 1009
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only driving force of change in nuisance provisions: courts also played an
important role, which is not a common feature in civil law. Finally,
convergence has been prompted by the preeminent role of administrative
regulation on nuisances that may affect a large number of estates:
jurisdictions are converging toward highly complex nuisance regulations.
29
The following Subsections explore the regulation in five different
jurisdictions, and Section 1.D summarizes the threads underlying European
regulation.
1. France
The broadest regulation of the protection of the right to enjoy one's
property can be found in the oldest regulation of the ones analyzed: the
Napoleonic Code of 1804. The French Civil Code states the following in its
article 544: "[p]roperty is the right of enjoying and disposing of things in the
most absolute manner, provided they are not used in a way prohibited by the
laws or statutes."
30
In fact, the preparatory works of the Code make no mention of
nuisance.31 Thus, to challenge a nuisance situation, the only option was the
general damage action, which is a fault-based liability clause in article 1382
of the Code: "[e]very action of man whatsosever which occasions injury to
another, binds him through whose fault it happened to reparation thereof."-
32
The traditional nuisance scenario does not often fit a framework based
on fault, though. Thus, it was up to the French judges to find a solution to
neighboring problems. They used an "abus de droit" framework, particularly
for interferences created with the aim to affect the neighbor.33 If property
were absolute, abusing only one's own rights would be the source of liability.
Later, French judges also created the doctrine of "troubles de voisinage"
(neighbors' problems) when a use of land was unduly offensive.34 The
analysis of "troubles de voisinage" is based on the idea that one who profits
from an activity that his neighbor does not and imposes harm on him should
29 Georg von Wangenheim & Fernando Gomez, Conflicts of Entitlements in Property Law: The
Complexity and Monotonicity of Rules, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2389, 2391-95 (2015).
30. THE NAPOLEONIC CODE OF 1804, supra note 12, art. 544, at 150.
31. GORDLEY & TAYLOR VON MEHREN, supra note 9, at 170.
32. THE NAPOLEONIC CODE OF 1804, supra note 12, art. 1382, at 378.
33. James Gordley, Disturbances Among Neighbours in French Law, in 2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF
LIABILITY BETWEEN NEIGHBOURS 65, 84-85 (James Gordley ed., 2010).
34. Id. at 69; see also Thierry Kirat, Les conflits lid;s au voisinage. L'effet des relationsjuridiques
sur la construction institutionnelle de l'espace, in PROXIMITES ET CHANGEMENTS SOCIO-ECONOMIQUES
DANS LES MONDES RURAUX 243, 249-50 (2005) (Fr.).
[Vol. 92:10031010
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compensate his neighbor for the harm. Nonetheless, if the neighbor has
chosen a particularly sensitive activity, he should not be compensated. This
judge-made law is still in place, but it has been complemented by regulation
mitigating nuisances. For example, the Planning Code prohibits issuing a
building permit if a structure "may be exposed to grave nuisance..., and in
particular, those due to noise."35 This rule is not tailored to the particular
situation and has no standard of unreasonableness. But judges have not been
the only source of change. For example, the French Code of Construction
and Housing allows the "coming to the nuisance" defense.
36
In March 2017, the Ministry of Justice of the French Government issued
a draft bill amending the tort provisions in the Civil Code (Projet de Reforme
de la Responsabilit Civile).37 The Project aims to modernize the tort
provisions (extra-contractual liability) in the Civil Code, pushing the agenda
set by Ordinance n'2016-131 of February 10, 2016 for the reform of contract
law, the general regime of obligations and proof of obligations.38 The
proposed text includes a nuisance provision.
The Project would amend article 1244 of the Code as follows:
The owner, lessee, holder of a title whose principal object is a permission
to occupy or exploit land or a building, or a person who commissions work
on land or enjoys the latter's authority, who causes a nuisance exceeding
the normal inconveniences of being neighbours, is liable strictly for the
harm resulting from the nuisance.
Where a harmful activity has been authorised by an administrative means,
the court may, however, award damages or order reasonable measures
permitting the nuisance to be stopped.39
35. CODE DE L'URBANISME art. RI 11-3 (Fr.), translated in Gordley, supra note 33, at 79.
36. CODE DE LA CONSTRUCTION ET DE L'HABITATION art. Li 12-16 (Fr).
37. Projet De Reforme De La Responsabilite Civile [Reform Bill on Civil Liability], (proposed
Mar. 13, 2017) (Fr.), http://www.justice.gouv.fr/publication/Projet-de reforme de la.responsabilite_
civile 13032017.pdf, translated in Reform Bill of Civil Liability (proposed Mar. 13,2017), http://www.te
xtes.justice.gouv.fr/art-pix/reform bill onscivil-liability-march_2017.pdf. Previously, other proposed
amendments by Terre, Catala, and B~teille also included nuisance provisions intended for inclusion in
the code as an anchor for the "troubles of neighbors." Clement Bizet, Les troubles du voisinage: definition
et r~gime, in AVANT-PROJET DE LOt RFtORME DE LA RESPONSABILIT CIVILE 21, 22, 24 (2018),
https://hal-univ-parisI 0.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01793099/document.
38. Ordonnance 2016-131 du 10 f~vrier 2016 portant r~forme du droit des contrats, du regime
g~n~ral et de la preuve des obligations, JOURNAL OFFIC1EL DE LA RI PUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.]
[Official Gazette of France], Feb. 11, 2016, No. 26.
39. Projet De Reforme De La Responsabilite Civile art. 1244.
2019] 1011
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2. Germany
Almost a century after the approval of the Napoleonic Code, the
German Civil Code ("BGB"), approved in 1896 (coming into force in 1900),
regulated ownership with more limitations than its French counterpart in
section 1004:
If ownership is impaired in any other way than by deprivation or
withholding of possession, the owner may require the disturber to remove
the injury. If a continuance of the injury is to be apprehended, the owner
may apply for an injunction.
The claim is barred if the owner is bound to submit to the injury.
40
Even before the BGB, German courts had ruled on neighbors' disputes
applying standards of strict liability. In fact, up until 1883, industrial users
were always at the losing end. In 1883, the Supreme Court of the Empire
(Reichsgericht) adopted the locality rule, around the same time as industrial
interests grew in importance. The interpretation of this provision in the early
years of the twentieth century was clearly favorable to the developing
industry: instead of defining locality as the surrounding area, courts looked
at the situation in other cities.4 1 This locality rule was incorporated in section
906 of the BGB, showing this slightly more limited conception of ownership.
Section 906 expands the type, although not the choice necessarily, of
remedies available. Instead of an injunction, if damages resulted from a
nuisance that the plaintiff had to tolerate, the defendant would have to pay
permanent damages. Section 906 of the current BGB provides the following:
(1) The owner of a plot of land may not prohibit the introduction of gases,
steam, smells, smoke, soot, warmth, noise, vibrations and similar
influences emanating from another plot of land to the extent that the
influence does not interfere with the use of his plot of land, or interferes
with it only to an insignificant extent.
... (2) The same applies to the extent that a material interference is caused
by a use of the other plot of land that is customary in the location and
cannot be prevented by measures that are financially reasonable for users
of this kind. Where the owner is obliged to tolerate an influence under
these provisions, he may require from the user of the other plot of land
reasonable compensation in money if the influence impairs a use of the
40. The German Civil Code art. 1004, at 226 (Chung Hui Wang trans., 1907), https://archive.org/
details/germancivilcodOOgerm/page/n3 (providing a translation of the original German Civil Code).
41. Andreas Thier, Disturbances Between Neighbours in Germany 1850-2000, in 2 THE
DEVELOPMENT OF LIABILITY BETWEEN NEIGHBOURS, supra note 33, at 87, 93.
[Vol. 92:10031012
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owner's plot of land that is customary in the location or its income beyond
the degree that the owner can be expected to tolerate.
42
In 1994, this text was added to paragraph (1):
An insignificant interference is normally present if the limits or targets laid
down in statutes or by statutory orders are not exceeded by the influences
established and assessed under these provisions. The same applies to
values in general administrative provisions that have been issued under
section 48 of the Federal Environmental Impact Protection Act [Bundes-
Immissionsschutzgesetz] and represent he state of the art.
4 3
This legislative amendment goes in line with codifying the complex
rules that Professors Georg von Wangenheeim and Fernando Gomez
analyzed44 or the broader pliability rules (a combination of property and
liability rules) that Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky introduced.
45
In its current reading, section 906 is a great example of how legislation has
tried to resolve the tension between the public interest and the principle of
free enjoyment of one's property. In other words, it shows the connection
between administrative law and nuisance. The effect of embracing
administrative law solutions for environmental issues and neighbor relations
reduces the remedies toolkit. This scheme is reflected today not only in the
1994 version of the BGB but also in a provision of the 1974 Federal Act for
the protection against emissions.46 Like the BGB, this Act excludes
injunctions (actio negatoria) and only allows for requiring precautions or
compensation for both harm to one's property and lost income if it stems
from an activity that has been licensed by the administration. This concept
of denial damage is gaining terrain.
Nonetheless, this displacement of injunctions was also not an
innovation in Germany. Since 1869, when the Industrial Code for the North
German Federation was issued, case law has recognized it. The Industrial
Code established that there was no injunction if the activity emitting the
42. Birgerliches Gesetzbuches [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 906, translation at https://www.gesetze-
im-intemet.de/englisch bgb/englisch bgb.pdf.
43. Id. § 906, para. 1, sentences 2-3.
44. See generally von Wangenheim & Gomez, supra note 29 (analyzing the interaction between
private law rules and public law regulatory standards).
45. See generally Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1
(2002) (discussing contingent rules and entitlements, that is rules that protect the holder of a property
entitlement or liability rule, depending on whether some condition has been met or not).
46. Bundes-lmmissionsschutzgesetz [BlmSchG] [Federal Immission Control Act], Mar. 15, 1974,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBL 1] at 721, last amended by Gesetz [G], July 18, 2017, BGBL I at
2771, art. 3 (Ger.), https://www.gesetze-im-intemet.debimschg/BJNR007210974.html#BJNR00721097
4BJNG000103360.
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nuisance had a license.47 This defense was extended by courts to all cases
where there was a permit48 or, more recently, when the activities were
deemed in the public interest.49 Once again, in this realm, courts went beyond
the text. Courts have connected the locality rule and administrative operating
licenses rule that "a facility not licensed by the administration could not be
judged as customary in a place."5 Courts have also affected the relationship
between administrative statutes and nuisance when judges have encountered
cases in which there was a violation of emissions administrative standards.
While the violation does not automatically trigger the application of nuisance
because the link between the damage and the violation needs to be proven,
courts have reversed the burden of proof.51
3. Spain
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 is thought to be influenced by the
French Napoleonic Code, but its nuisance regulation is far more specific than
the French one, perhaps because it was approved almost a century later. The
specific regulation of article 590 of the Spanish Civil Code suggests that
there is not a clear correlation between industrial development and the
intricacies of the nuisance regulation because Germany was equally, if not
more developed, than Spain and both their codes give specific responses to
nuisance.
The detailed regulation in the Spanish Civil Code may be explained by
the existence of a historical regulation of nuisance. In Spain, there were
references in the Partidas of Alfonso X (The Wise) and in el Fuero Real,52
47. Gewerbeordnung ffir den Norddeutschen Bund [Trade Regulations for the North German
Confederation], June 21, 1869, § 26 (current version at Gewerbeordnung [GewO], as amended Gesetz
[G], Nov. 29, 2018, BGBL I at 2666, tit. II, https://www.gesetze-im-intemet.de/gewo/BJNR002450
869.html#BJNR002450869BJNG000202301 (Ger.)).
48. For an example of a case in which a court considered that neighbors had to tolerate the sparks
from a railway because the railway had a permit, see Reichsgericht [RG] [Federal Court of Justice] Sept.
20, 1882, ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES REICHSGERICHTS [N ZIVILSACHEN [RGZ] 265 (267), 1882 (Ger.).
49. Thier, supra note 41, at 95.
50. Id. at 97, 99 (citing Bundesgerichtshof [BGH{] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 30, 1998, 140
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES [N ZIV[LSACHEN [BGHZ] 1 (6), 1999 (Ger.)). Building
licenses are only one factor to consider when analyzing the customary nature of an activity, though. The
role of courts in the expansion of strict liability emanating from section 906 of the BGB did not end here.
Courts have applied section 906 of the BGB to cases in which there was an illegal use of land and which
would result in a negligence claim if the defendant had acted with fault. Id. at 102 (citing
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 2, 1984, 90 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES [N ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 255 (262) (Ger.)).
51. Id. at 100.
52. Aniceto Masferrer, Relations Between Neighbours in Spanish Law 1850-2000, in 2 THE
DEVELOPMENT OF LIABILITY BETWEEN NEIGHBOURS, supra note 33, at 173, 177.
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both from the thirteenth century. In the early nineteenth century, a legal text
(the Novisima Recopilacion), while not properly regulating nuisance,
established rules about fire prevention or location of industries that
demonstrate the concerns regarding nuisance.
This legal tradition is embodied in article 590 of the Spanish Civil Code,
which is located in the property part of the Code. It reads as follows:
Nobody may build near a wall belonging to another or a party wall wells,
drains, aqueducts, ovens, forges, chimneys, stables, deposits of corrosive
materials, artefacts which moved by steam engine, or machines which, by
themselves, or as a result of their products are dangerous or harmful,
without keeping the distances provided in applicable regulations and local
customs, and without performing the necessary protective works, subject
to the conditions provided by the same regulations as to the manner of
performing them.
In the absence of regulations, the precautions deemed necessary to prevent
any damage to the neighbouring properties or buildings shall be taken,
after the issuance of an expert report.
53
Again, the Spanish Civil Code offers a more detailed regulation in
article 1908 in the part dedicated to torts. It specifically targets situations that
may amount o a nuisance and adopts a strict liability rule. A codified strict
liability rule in the late nineteenth century was not common. Article 1908
reads as such:
Likewise, the owners shall be liable for damages caused:
1. By the explosion of machines which have not been taken care of with
due diligence, and by the inflammation of explosive substances which
have not been put in a safe and suitable place.
2. By excessive fumes which are harmful to persons or properties.
3. By the fall of trees placed on transit spaces, unless it results from force
maj eure.
4. By the emanations of drains or deposits of infectious materials which
have been built without observing precautions appropriate to their
location.
54
In Spain, too, the role of courts has been central. While scholars of other
jurisdictions perceive courts as moving in a single direction, Spanish courts
have used different tests. As a recent Supreme Court decision states: "[t]he
response of the Spanish legal regime and its complementary case law to the
problem of harm caused to an individual by immissions that today we would
53. C.C. art. 590 (Spain), translated in MINiSTER1O DE JUSTICIA, supra note 13, at 107.
54. Id. art. 1908.
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label as 'environmental' has not been homogeneous."55 Echoing Roman law,
the requirement of intention dominated some nuisance cases even though
article 1908 does not require fault. From there, courts incorporated the
French doctrine of abuse of rights, which was incorporated in the Spanish
Civil Code in 1974,56 during the dictatorship years. When the doctrine of
abuse of rights fell short, courts looked to other European countries, namely
Germany, for a model to follow. There, the distinction between nuisances
that must be tolerated and those that must not hinges on the abnormal use of
the property.57 The confusion in the jurisprudence has been such that while
there is no requirement of fault to request an injunction, courts have applied
fault principles when an action for damages caused by nuisance has been
brought.5 8 In some of the cases in which they required fault when they should
not have, the courts paid lip service to negligence by setting the bar of
diligence extremely high, even in cases where the activity was subjected to
a license and public regulation had been complied with.59
4. Netherlands
In the Netherlands, the discussion under the old Civil Code from 1838,
which preceded the industrial revolution starting around 1850, traced a
similar path to the one in French private law. Initially, the approach focused
on the idea of property and the abuse of rights under article 625 of the old
Civil Code, which determined that an owner could not use his property in a
way that caused nuisance to others.60 This was criticized because it treated
article 625 as a basis for liability beyond the general negligence provision of
article 1401, which read: "[e]very unlawful act which causes damage to
another obliges the person by whose fault that damage was caused to
compensate it."' 61 When the focus shifted to article 1401, the role of article
625 was interpreted to be merely that there was no defense against liability
based on exercising one's own property right.62 The unlawfulness of article
55. S.T.S., May 31, 2007 (R.J., No. 589, p. 3431) (Spain).
56. De Bases para la modificaci6n del titulo preliminar del C6digo Civil ch. 3, art. 7, para. 2
(B.O.E. 1974, 163) (Spain).
57. Masferrer, supra note 52, at 186-90.
58. Id. at 190-91.
59. Id. at 191.
60. Art. 2:625 BW (OUD) (Neth.); A.J. Verheij, Fault Liability Between Neighbors in the
Netherlands 1850-2000, in 2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIABILITY BETWEEN NEIGHBOURS supra note 33,
at 107, 110.
61. Elizabeth van Schilfgaarde, Negligence Under the Netherlands Civil Code-An Economic
Analysis, 21 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 265, 272 (1991) (alteration in original) (quoting Art. 3:1401 BW (OUD)
(Neth.)).
62. Verheij, supra note 60, at 110-11.
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1401 required either a violation of a statutory duty or the infringement of a
right. In nuisance actions, Dutch courts expanded the traditional grounds for
unlawfulness by adopting a proper social conduct test to determine when the
nuisance was unlawful and, as a consequence, negligent. Based on this test,
in 1919, the Dutch Supreme Court accepted noise as a violation of a property
right.63 The same 1919 decision made clear that holding a license did not
give those creating a nuisance immunity from a tort action. In this case, the
legislature responded faster than the courts. The Industrial Nuisance Act of
187564 adopted a complex licensing system and an expansive view of
nuisance by declaring that the denial of a license could be based on one of
the following grounds: "(1) danger; (2) damage to property... ; and
(3) serious nuisance, e.g. nuisance that makes a house partially or entirely
impossible to live in and spreading of waste or disgusting smells."
65
One of the scholars who defended the assertion that article 1401 was
the provision applicable to nuisance cases was a drafter of the new 1992 Civil
Code, and accordingly, the social conduct test is still the controlling
approach. The new Civil Code, though, has more specific provisions. Article
5:37 reads as follows:
The owner of immovable property may not, to a degree or in a way that is
unlawful according to Article 6:162 of the Civil Code, cause nuisance to
owners of other immovable properties by instigating sounds, vibrations,
smells, smoke or gases or by denying these owners daylight or fresh air or
by taking away the support of buildings or constructions.
66
The reference to article 6:16267 is still a reference to negligence,
63. 'HR 31 januari 1919, NJ 1919, 161 m.nt Molengraaff (Lindenbaum/Cohen) (Neth.); see also
Verheij, supra note 60, at 118-19.
64. Verheij, supra note 60, at 128-29. Professor A.J. Verheij describes that from 1850 to 1880,
domestic industry developed thanks to steam engines, railroads, and trade. Id. at 129. In 1880, the
development of heavy industry started. Id.
65. Verheij supra note 60, at 125 (discussing Wet Tot Regeling Van Het Toezicht Bij Het Oprigten
Van Inrigtingen, Welke Gevaar, Schade Of Hinder Kunnen Veroorzaken 10 junij 1875, S. 1875, 95
(repealed 1952) (Neth.)).
66. Art. 5:37 BW (Neth.), translated in Dutch Civil Code: Book 5 Real Property Rights, DUTCH
Civ. L., http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/civilcodebook055.htm (last visited May 18, 2019).
67. Article 6:162 reads as follows:
1. A person who commits a tortious act (unlawful act) against another person that can be
attributed to him, must repair the damage that this other person has uffered as a result thereof.
2. As a tortious act is regarded a violation of someone else's right (entitlement) and an act or
omission in violation of a duty imposed by law or of what according to unwritten law has to be
regarded as proper social conduct, always as far as there was no justification for this behaviour.
3. A tortious act can be attributed to the tortfeasor [the person committing the tortious act] if it
results from his fault or from a cause for which he is accountable by virtue of law or generally
accepted principles (common opinion).
Art. 6:162 BW (Neth.), translated in Dutch Civil Code: Book 6 the Law of Obligations, DUTCH Civ. L.,
http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/civilcodebook066.htm (last visited May 18, 2019).
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showing the difficulty that civil law jurisdictions had in accommodating
strict liability. The interpretation of the unlawfulness of the conduct
depended on the definition of proper social conduct in Dutch case law. The
test for proper social conduct is a multifactor test, which allows courts room
to adapt the rule to the particular circumstances, such as the locality.68
While negligence still plays a role, its role has been diminished by the
advent of explicit strict liability in many instances, such as the collapse of
real property (article 6:174),69 or the damage caused by dangerous
substances (article 6:175).70 The latter incorporates administrative standards
to define when a substance is dangerous, and thus, the article applies. The
switch between a property rule and a liability rule-that is, between
injunction and damages-is not based on an administrative standard in the
Dutch Civil Code. It is based on the public interest; the court will assess if a
nuisance must be tolerated, although with compensation, based on
compelling reasons of public interest (article 6:168).7 1 Administrative
regulations define what is in the public interest, but the Dutch Civil Code
allows courts to look beyond regulations.
5. Catalonia
One of the most recent civil codes, the Catalan Civil Code of 2006, has
a more detailed regulation. It includes a cessation action on articles 544-572
and 544-6,73 and then it devotes two articles to regulate what legal (article
68. Verheij, supra note 60, at 116.
69. Art. 6:174 BW (Neth.), translated in Dutch Civil Code. Book 6 the Law of Obligations, supra
note 67. The Dutch Supreme Court refused to apply this provision to a case in which, as a result of the
collapse of a building, asbestos particles had affected the premises of the neighbors. Verheij, supra note
60, at 122.
70. Art. 6:175 BW (Neth.), translated in Dutch Civil Code: Book 6 the Law of Obligations, supra
note 67.
71. ld. art. 6:168.
72. Article 544-5 reads as follows:
Negatory action is not appropriate in the following cases:
a) If the disturbances or emissions it is intended to put an end to or future disturbances or
emissions that it is claimed to prevent do not prejudice any legitimate interest of the proprietors
in their property.
b) If the proprietors must support the disturbance due to a provision of this code or due to legal
businesses.
CODI CIVIL DE CATALUNYA art. 544-5, translated in Law 5/2006, of 10 May, on the Fifth Book of the
Civil Code of Catalonia, Relating to Real Rights, supra note 15, at 31.
73. Article 554-6 reads as follows:
1. Negatory action is aimed at the protection of the freedom of domain of the real estate property
and the re-establishment of the thing to the state prior to a legal or material disturbance.
2. In the exercise of negatory action, the corresponding indemnification for the damage and
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546-13) and illegal (article 546-14) nuisances are, paying close attention to
the role of regulation, as well as the economic benefits of the conflicting
activities. It is worth noting that before the codification in 1990, the Catalan
Parliament passed an act on nuisance with very similar regulations regarding
the connections with administrative regulations. Both recognize that even
though an activity may comply with existing regulations, it may still be a
nuisance if damage occurs and the damage caused should be compensated.
Both also established the nonrebuttable presumption that if an activity
exceeds the legal limits set in specific legislation, the activity is a nuisance.
It also regulates a situation reminiscent of the famous U.S. case, Boomer v.
Atlantic Cement Co.74 The Catalan Civil Code allows an activity to continue
while compensating for past and future damages if the cessation of said
activity will have dire economic consequences. The nuisance provisions
seem to align with the current regulation in section 906 of the BGB and, in
general, with the trend toward the incorporation of administrative law in
private law analysis.
1. The proprietors of an estate must tolerate emissions coming from a
neighbouring estate that are innocuous or that cause prejudice that is not
substantial. In general, prejudice is considered substantial when it exceeds
the limit or indicative values established by the laws or regulations.
2. The proprietors of an estate must tolerate emissions that cause
substantial prejudice if they are the result of the normal use of the
neighbouring estate, according to the regulations, and if putting an end to
them involves an expenditure that is economically disproportionate.
3. In the case referred to in Section 2, the proprietors affected have the
right to receive indemnification for damage caused in the past and
economic compensation, set by common agreement or judicially, for any
that may be caused in the future if these emissions excessively affect the
produce of the estate or its normal use, according to local custom.
... 5. Substantial emissions that come from administratively authorised
installations give the neighbouring proprietors affected the right to request
the adoption of technically possible and economically reasonable
measures to prevent the damaging consequences and to request
indemnification for the damage caused. If the consequences can not be
prevented in this way, the proprietors have the right to economic
compensation, established by common agreement or judicially, for
damage that may occur in the future.
75
74. See generally Boomer v. At. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970) (allowing for permanent
damages when the harm suffered is small compared to the cost of removing the nuisance).
75. CODI CIVIL DE CATALLJNYA art. 546-14, translated in Law 5/2006, of 1O May, on the Fifth
Book of the Civil Code of Catalonia, Relating to Real Rights supra note 15, at 38-39.
2019] 1019
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
D. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
First, although every continental civil code analyzed has a common
origin in Roman law, the lack of clarity in Roman norms still seeped into the
codification. Moreover, as mentioned, it cannot be said that their Roman
origins translated into convergence at the time of codification. Similarly, the
divergence at the outset cannot be explained by the different levels of
industrialization. The hypothesis was that differences between nuisance
provisions included in the civil codes traced the economic development of
the particular country. The idea behind such a hypothesis is that those rules
enacted at the beginning of industrialization coupled with development of
urban areas would be more detailed because the conflicts between
neighboring activities would be more acute, particularly in the absence of
zoning and other public regulations. Germany and Spain approved their civil
codes at roughly the same time, and while Germany had a higher level of
industrialization, its provisions do not necessarily reflect this. An alternative
hypothesis could be that at the beginning of industrialization, while conflicts
were acute, institutional actors felt the need to be lenient toward those
industrial activities imposing on their neighbors given that the social benefits
they brought were high. Thus, jurisdictions would pay more heed to nuisance
once industrialization was mature, and the marginal benefit from an
industrial activity may not exceed the marginal harm to a nonindustrial
actor.76 Broad nuisance provisions may suggest that these adaptations could
occur at the judicial level.
Second, while nuisance provisions did not change much in the codes
until the 1990s, their interpretations have. Judges have been very important
driving forces of evolution and convergence in nuisance law toward strict
liability.
Third, the evolution of nuisance provisions where they have been
amended or where recent provisions have been enacted acknowledges the
complexity of the current framework regulating relations between neighbors
increasingly dominated by public law. Borrowing Professor Mark
Geistfeld's title, it can be said that the newest provisions make explicit the
role of tort law in the age of statutes.77 As a result, these provisions are more
complex.
There are two main tenets of this relationship between tort and
administrative regulation. First, some regulations specifically state that if
76. See Abraham, supra note 26.
77. See generally Mark A. Geistfeld, Tort Law in the Age of Statutes, 99 IOWA L. REv. 957 (2014)
(explaining the relationship between tort law and statutes).
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there is damage and the defendant has violated the pertinent administrative
regulations, it will be assumed that the damage is substantial enough that the
nuisance does not need to be tolerated.7 8 Even in the absence of such an
explicit regulation, if damage exists, there would be a strong presumption
against the defendant before the courts. Second, complying with the
administrative regulation does not mean that nuisance is excluded if there is
damage, but rather the remedy changes, as will next be described. As
Professors Georg von Wangenhein and Fernando Gomez pointed out,
nuisance rules today are a combination of property and liability rules, and
the switch between the two types of rules is provided by a regulatory
standard.79 While administrative regulation could explicitly preempt
nuisance actions by declaring an activity a legal nuisance,8" thus requiring
the landowner affected to endure it, the avenue most commonly taken by
European jurisdictions is that even when in compliance with the regulation,
damages and preventive measures, but not injunctions, are available.81 The
impact of the coordination with administrative standards on Coasean
bargaining remains to be analyzed. If an actor needs to comply with a
regulation, the option of paying the party supporting a higher level of
interference becomes less attractive because the actor will also face a fine.
82
II. FORCED CONVERGENCE AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL?
All the civil law jurisdictions analyzed are part of the European Union
and parties to the European Convention on Human Rights. As a result, there
could be transnational forces of convergence, defining either nuisance rules
themselves or the realm in which private nuisance can operate.
This Article analyzes three potential sources of convergence. First,
while there has not been a binding harmonization of private law and, thus,
78. This aligns with the rule IP (B stops A up to a point, and A pays damages associated with its
lawful operation) that Professor Levmore describes in his work, which enhances the seminal article by
Judge Guido Calabresi and Professor A. Douglas Melamed on this topic. Levmore, supra note 6, at 2149;
see also Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 20, at 1092-93.
79. Von Wangenheim & Gomez, supra note 29, at 2392, 2398.
80. A partial and indirect way to declare something a legal nuisance is by allowing the "coming to
the nuisance" defense because it allows certain activities to continue if they were in the area before the
plaintiff. This is what Article L. 112-16 of the French Construction and Housing Code does. CODE DE LA
CONSTRUCTION ET DE L'HABITATION [FRENCH CONSTRUCTION AND HOUSING CODE] art. LI 12-16 (Fr.).
81. "Corrective justice is, therefore, attenuated in a regulatory system." Richard A. Epstein,
Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 101 (1979).
82. Fines affect ex ante decisions on investments. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Property
Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601 (2001) (explaining
the role that different ex post rules, including fines, can have on ex ante decisions despite easy bargaining
and the distributive effects of the ex post rules).
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there is no European nuisance, the Draft Common Frame of Reference
("DCFR"), which offers a sort of uniform civil code for European countries,
will be briefly discussed. The DCFR can offer a sense of what direction
jurisdictions will take in the future, a focal point for convergence of sorts.
Next, this Article covers the Environmental Liability Directive. All countries
analyzed above need to implement the Directive. Given the subject matter of
the Directive, it has a clear impact on nuisance. It has a potential impact in
two ways. First, for those regulations that incorporate the administrative
standard to assess whether the interference is substantial, the standard is now
homogeneous because it is set at the European level. Second, it establishes a
public liability regime, and thus may compete with private nuisance actions.
Finally, this Section reviews the decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights that have considered nuisances a violation of a person's right to
respect for his private and family life as well as his home. National
authorities that fail to respond to nuisances promptly and adequately may be
found in violation of the European Human Rights Convention. As a
consequence, national authorities may reduce even further the need for
nuisance provisions to play a complementary role, although its existence
clearly plays such a role and contributes to deterrence.
A. THE DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE
In 2009, the European Commission published the DCFR.83 The DCFR
is similar to the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement in the
United States, without being either.84 Although it has been described a
"European Civil Code in all but name,"85 it is not yet that. It sets up the
minimum common denominator across the private law of European
countries that should facilitate the future unification of private law at the
European level to strengthen the common market, but there is not yet
anything to restate. The DCFR aims to serve as a model for both future
European Law and future national law as it also identifies the best legal
solutions.
86
83. Frank Emmert, The Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)-The Most Interesting
Development in Contract Law Since the Code Civil and the BGB, 2 CUADERNOS DE LA MAESTRIA EN
DERECHO 7, 12 (2012). For further discussion on international tort law and the DCFR, see generally
WALTER VAN GERVEN ET AL., CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL TORT LAW (2000); Gerhard Wagner, The Law of Torts in the DCFR, in THE COMMON
FRAME OF REFERENCE (Gerhard Wagner ed., 2009).
84. Emmert, supra note 83, at 11-12; Nils Jansen & Reinhard Zimmermann, "A European Civil
Code in All But Name": Discussing the Nature and Purposes of the Draft Common Frame of Reference,
69 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 98, 101-02 (2010).
85. Jansen & Zimmerman, supra note 84, at 100.
86. The DCFR also aimed to provide an optional set of rules that parties could choose when
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Article VI.-3:206 of the DCFR (Accountability for damage caused by
dangerous ubstances or emissions) states the following :
(1) A keeper of a substance or an operator of an installation is accountable
for the causation by that substance or by emissions from that installation
of personal injury and consequential oss, loss within VI.-2:202 (Loss
suffered by third persons as a result of another's personal injury or death),
loss resulting from property damage, and burdens within VI.-2:209
(Burdens incurred by the State upon environmental impairment), if:
(a) having regard to their quantity and attributes, at the time of the
emission, or, failing an emission, at the time of contact with the substance
it is very likely that the substance or emission will cause such damage
unless adequately controlled; and
(b) the damage results from the realisation of that danger.
... (3) "Emission" includes:
(a) the release or escape of substances;
(b) the conduction of electricity;
(c) heat, light and other radiation;
(d) noise and other vibrations; and
(e) other incorporeal impact on the environment.
... (5) However, a person is not accountable for the causation of damage
under this Article if that person:
(a) does not keep the substance or operate the installation for purposes
related to that person's trade, business or profession; or
(b) shows that there was no failure to comply with statutory standards of
control of the substance or management of the installation. 87
The DCFR targets only harm to people or property, not pure ecological
damage. As such, diminished revenues by a restaurant as a result of the loss
of an environmental amenity do not fall under this article. The scope is
limited to: (1) substances-solid, liquid, or gas-that are objectively
dangerous, either by nature or because they are kept in large quantities; and
(2) emissions-a broader concept. The DCFR adopts strict liability for
nuisances created by commercial or industrial activities. Non-professional
parties, according to the comments to the DCFR, may still be liable but under
a negligence rule.88 According to article 3:102 of the DCFR, a person is
negotiating an agreement, particularly in contract law. Reinhard Zimmermann, The Present State of
European Private Law, 57 AM. J. CoMP. L. 479, 510 (2009). However, its provisions could also serve as
the baseline to negotiate potential settlements between neighbors in nuisance cases. Id. at 510-11.
87. STUDY GRP. ON A EUROPEAN CtVIL CODE & RESEARCH GRP. ON EC PRIVATE LAW (AcQuIs
GRP.), PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 3396 (Christian von
Bar et al. eds., 2009), https://www.law.kuleuven.be/personal/mstorme/european-private-law-en.pdf.
88. Id.
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negligent when he "does not meet the particular standard of care provided
by a statutory provision whose purpose is the protection of the person
suffering the damage from that damage."89 Furthermore, under the DCFR,
compliance with public regulation standards offers a defense, an issue not
admitted in every jurisdiction. The DCFR may be a force of convergence in
the future if either the European Union decided to enact these provisions or
if countries used it as a focal point for future reforms of their civil codes. As
of today, it shows the tension between negligence and strict liability that
many European jurisdictions face when regulating nuisance and the need to
acknowledge the preeminence of administrative regulations.
B. E.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY REGULATION
1. Directive
It is impossible to fully grasp the role of nuisance in European law
without understanding the European Directive 2004/35, of 21 of April, on
environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of
environmental damage.9" This Directive aims at protecting public property
or common goods that are not covered by civil code rules protecting private
property and at solving the collective action problem normally associated
with such environmental damage. Furthermore, the transboundary character
of many environmental issues made the common regulation necessary. The
Directive adopts the "polluter pays" principle9' and specifically states that it
is complementary to the national regulations. For the purpose of this piece,
article 3(3) states: "[w]ithout prejudice to relevant national legislation, this
Directive shall not give private parties a right of compensation as a
consequence of environmental damage or of an imminent threat of such
damage."
92
The content of article 3(3) leaves national nuisance provisions intact,
and it is surprising for two reasons. First, Directive 2004/35 deviated from
89. Id. at 3274.
90. Directive 2004/35, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on
Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage, 2004
O.J. (L 143) 56 (EU) [hereinafter Directive on Environmental Liability].
91. Article 3(1) of the Directive sets a strict liability standard for those activities it considers
particularly dangerous. Id. at 60. The list of activities can be found in Annex III of the Directive. Id. at
70-71. In all other cases--that is, on cases of environmental damage caused by activities not considered
dangerous per se-liability is based on fault. For an analysis of the effect of strict liability and fault
liability on the prevention of environmental damage, see MICHAEL FAURE & GORAN SKOGH, THE
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ENviRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW 241-61 (2003).
92. Directive on Environmental Liability, supra note 90, at 61.
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the content of the White Paper93 that started the legislative process for this
Directive. In that White Paper, the Commission pointed at the need to create
a level playing field for all the actors subject to E.U. environmental
liability. 94 Given that the European Union embraces the complementarity
between private and public enforcement, the lack of harmonization of private
remedies is surprising because the Directive was expected to follow the steps
of other European regulations, such as defective products.95 It is remarkable
that something similar happened in the case of waste regulation. The
substantive regulation of waste management in the European Union was
accompanied by a proposal of harmonized liability framework, in which
compliance with a license to operate was not considered a defense.96 The
proposal was abandoned, and now waste falls under the Environmental
Liability Directive.
Second, the European Union is a member of the Aahrus Convention,
and it has been argued that the European Union's lack of civil remedies in
the environmental liability directive may be in tension with article 9(2)(b) of
the Convention, which calls for such remedies.97 In fact, in 2016, the
European Commission in its roadmap, titled "[c]ommunication on access to
justice at national level related to measures implementing EU environmental
law," expressed the problems that still exist due to the lack of harmonization
across member states.
98
93. Commission White Paper on Environmental Liability, COM (2000) 66 final (Feb. 9, 2000). A
White Paper "launch[es] a debate with the public, stakeholders, the European Parliament and the Council
in order to arrive at a political consensus." Glossary of Summaries, EUR-LEX, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/white.paper.html (last visited May 18, 2019).
94. Commission White Paper on Environmental Liability, supra note 93, at 15.
95. Gerrit Betlem, Torts, a European lus Commune and the Private Enforcement of Community
Law, 64 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 126, 128-29 (2005). For another example, check the 2004 Intellectual Property
Directive, which, following the premise that tort remedies can complement regulation to ensure
deterrence, aimed at harmonizing the sanctions, including private enforcement. Directive 2004/48/EC, of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights, 2004 O.J. (L 157) 45, 81 (EU).
96. Commission Proposalfor a Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste,
at 15, COM (1989) 282 final (Sept. 15, 1989).
97. Betlem, supra note 95, at 132. A similar claim can be made in relation to the European
Convention on Human Rights given that articles 6 (right to a fair trial) and 13 (right to an effective
remedy) offer a similar, albeit general, protections. Id. at 133-35 (analogizing the question of private civil
law remedies in the context of the Environmental Liability Directive with the Mufioz decision, in which
the issue was whether a standard laid by E.U. law was actionable under national tort law).
98. EUROPEAN COMM'N, COMMUNICATION ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT NATIONAL LEVEL
RELATED TO MEASURES IMPLEMENTING EU ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 2 (2016), http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/roadmaps/docs/2013 env 013 access to justice en.pdf.
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2. Countries' Responses
Each country must incorporate the contents of the Directive 2004/35
into their own national legislation. All national laws incorporating the E.U.
regulation go beyond harm to the environment by including provisions that
carve out property damages. Those private damages are not dealt with in the
special legislation.9 9 The statutes seem to set up clear boundaries between
environmental damage and other types of damages, closing the door to
potential claims of breach of statutory duty because the scope of the norm
does not cover those private interests. Instead, private damages are subject
to the general nuisance rules. It is difficult to imagine a case in which a court
will deny that, provided there is property damage, there is no nuisance when
the defendant has been found liable under the environmental liability
statutes. A violation of the statute will play a role when ascertaining fault, or
where nuisance is governed by strict liability, a violation can be sufficient
evidence that the damage reaches the threshold of significance and that such
nuisance should not be tolerated.'0 0
C. NUISANCE AS A VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
An interesting development in this field is the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR"), which considers nuisance a
violation of human rights. The ECHR did so in L6pez Ostra v. Spain. The
plaintiff, L6pez Ostra, lived near the town's waste-treatment plant, which
99. Examples of provisions stating that damages to property are not dealt with by the legislation
dealing with pure environmental damage include: Loi 2008-757 du ler aofit 2008 relative A la
responsabilit& environnementale et A diverses dispositions d'adaptation au droit communautaire dans le
domaine de lenvironnement (1), JOURNAL OFFICEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL
GAZETrE OF FRANCE], Aug. 2, 2008, p. 12361 (Fr.); Lei n. 19/2014 de 14 de abril Define as bases da
politica de ambiente, art. XIII, Didrio da Reptlblica n. 73/2014, 1 Srie A. 2400 (2014) (Port.);
Environmental Responsibility Law art. V (B.O.E. 2007, 255) (Spain). These provisions prevent the
compensation of damages decided by the public authority. The victim is obliged, then, to claim for
damages before the courts. The German regulation states such principle clearly when it declares the
potential liability of the tortfeasor, although it defers the case to the general courts. The Environmental
Liability Act sets forth the following:
If an environmental impact caused by an installation specified in Annex 1 causes a person's
death, injury to his body or damage to his health, or damage to an item of property, the operator
of the installation shall have an obligation to compensate the injured person for the resulting
damage.
Umwelthaftungsgesetz [UmweltHG] [Environmental Liability Act], Dec. 10, 1990, BGBL I at 2634, last
amended by Gesetz [G), July 17, 2017m BGBL I at 2421, § 1 (Ger.), https://www.gesetze-im-
intemet.de/englisch umwelthg/englisch umwelthg.html.
100. Nonetheless in 2005, Professor Gerrit Betlem predicted that a harmonization of E.U. law as a
result of the Environmental Liability Directive based on the breach of statutory duty. See Betlem, supra
note 95, at 145-48.
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caused odors, fumes, and noise.1 ' The Spanish executive authorities were
passive and did not respond promptly to stop the nuisance. 10 2 The ECHR in
L6pez Ostra expressed that: "severe environmental pollution may affect
individuals' well-being and prevent them from enjoying their homes in such
a way as to affect their private and family life adversely, without, however,
seriously endangering their health."10 3
Accordingly, the Court decided that L6pez Ostra had a right to respect
for her private and family life, her home, and her correspondence according
to article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others. 1
0 4
Courts generally give Spain's authorities room to balance the rights of
the individual with the public interest, but in this case, Spanish authorities
had gone too far. The Court awarded L6pez Ostra pecuniary damages based
on the depreciation of her home and nonpecuniary damages to compensate
for her mental anguish.'0 5 The Kingdom of Spain had to pay 4,000,000
pesetas in 1998 (around 27,719 in U.S. dollars).'°6
The ECHR has had the opportunity to reiterate the same doctrine in two
subsequent cases on immissions. Both cases were against Spain and about
noise nuisances. The cases are Moreno G6mez v. Spain10 7 and Cuenca
Zarzoso v. Spain.' 8 In the first decision, the Court stated that:
Although the object of Article 8 is essentially that of protecting the
individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it may
involve the authorities' adopting measures designed to secure respect for
private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between
themselves .... Whether the case is analysed in terms of a positive duty
on the State to take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the
101. L6pez Ostra v. Spain, 303 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 39, 39 (1994).
102. Seeid. at 55.
103. Id. at54.
104. Id. at 53-56 (quoting European Convention on Human Rights § 1, art. 8).
105. Id. at 40.
106. Id. at59.
107. G6mez v. Spain, 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 329.
108. Zarzoso v. Spain, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2018), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001 - 80296.
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applicants' rights under paragraph I of Article 8, or in terms of an
interference by a public authority to be justified in accordance with
paragraph 2 of Article 8, the applicable principles are broadly similar. In
both contexts regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck
between the competing interests of the individual and of the community
as a whole. Furthermore, even in relation to the positive obligations
flowing from the first paragraph of Article 8, in striking the required
balance the aims mentioned in the second paragraph may be of a certain
relevance .... 109
L6pez Ostra, Moreno G6mez, Cuenca Zarzoso, and other decisions,
such as the decision dealing with the noise produced by runaways at
Heathrow Airport, should push public authorities to enforce the
environmental regulations to prevent and stop nuisances, thus reducing the
sphere of private law. There is an obligation of the States that have signed
the European Convention on Human Rights to adopt the appropriate
administrative measures to prevent nuisances that affect the lives of their
citizens.
CONCLUSION: IS THERE STILL A ROLE FOR PRIVATE LAW?
This Article's analysis of the nuisance provisions in several European
civil law countries has shown the different stages of the protection against
nuisances: from property, to torts, and then to public regulation. At the time
of codification, these European countries did not converge even though their
traditions all stem from Roman law. Some countries have almost no
provision of nuisance; in other countries, fault liability triggers damages that
are combined with cessation actions; and yet, others adopted strict liability.
These divergent nuisance provisions still play a role today, albeit a
reduced one. European civil law jurisdictions' nuisance provisions reflect the
evolution from nuisance problems between two adjacent neighbors to a
scenario of nuisance conflicts between heterogeneous users with a high
number of potential defendants. Like in the common law, nuisance
provisions work well for the former. For the latter, public regulations take
the central stage. Recently enacted or amended civil codes converge in the
sense that they acknowledge the interplay between private law and public
regulation. In many cases, private nuisance is not wholly displaced, but the
remedies available to defendants will depend on whether the activity causing
a nuisance has been administratively authorized. If it is administratively
authorized, the cessation action that leads to an injunction remedy is no
109. G6mez, 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R at 341.
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longer available.
